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Abstract 
This dispute concerns the measures China took to implement the Dispute Settlement Body’s rulings in 
China–GOES (DS414), which had found a number of violations with respect to China’s antidumping 
and countervailing duties imposed on grain oriented flat-rolled electrical steel (GOES) imported from 
the United States. In this compliance proceeding, the United States claimed that the Redetermination 
issued by China’s Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) continued to violate WTO law. At the center of 
the dispute were MOFCOM’s findings that the US imports had the effect of suppressing and/or 
depressing the prices of domestic like products. While the Panel reached the conclusion that the 
MOFCOM findings were inconsistent with WTO rules, it did not clarify the criteria for determining 
such price effects. In this comment, we call for the adoption of a clearer and more objective standard 
for determining price suppression/depression in antidumping and countervailing duty investigations, 
via the tools of economic modeling.  
Keywords 
WTO dispute settlement, antidumping duty, countervailing duty, price suppression, price depression, 
causality, injury determination, China, econometric modeling, counterfactual analysis. 
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1. Introduction 
On 16 November 2012, the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) adopted the panel and Appellate 
Body reports in China–Grain Oriented Flat-Rolled Electrical Steel from the United States (China–
GOES).
1
 These reports found that China’s levy of antidumping and countervailing duties (AD/CVD) 
on US steel imports, as set forth in the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) Notice No. 21 [2010], was 
inconsistent with the Antidumping Agreement (ADA) and the Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement).
2
 To implement the DSB recommendations and rulings, 
MOFCOM issued a Redetermination on 31 July 2013, pursuant to which China continued to impose 
AD/CVD on the US steel imports, albeit with some adjustments on the rates of the duties.  
In February 2014, the United States brought this case under Article 21.5 of the Dispute Settlement 
Understanding (DSU), claiming that MOFCOM’s Redetermination failed to comply with the 
requirements of the ADA and the SCM Agreement. Notably, this is the first compliance dispute 
brought against China under DSU Article 21.5. 
The Panel in the compliance proceeding issued its report on 31 July 2015,
3
 which supported some 
of the US claims. Specifically, the Panel found that MOFCOM’s Redetermination was inconsistent 
with certain ADA and SCM provisions regarding injury determination and disclosure of essential facts. 
China did not appeal the Panel decision, as its AD/CVD measures had expired during the Panel 
proceeding in April 2015.
4
 The DSB adopted the Panel report on 31 August 2015. 
In this compliance case, it was not disputed that the US steel imports at issue were both dumped 
and subsidized; the dispute, instead, centred on whether the dumped and subsidized imports caused 
material injury to China’s domestic industry. Specifically, the key issue in the injury determination 
was whether the US imports had the effect of suppressing and/or depressing prices of China’s 
domestic like products, as found by the MOFCOM in its Redetermination. The disclosure issues raised 
in this case all concerned the adequacy of MOFCOM’s disclosure of essential facts regarding its injury 
determination via these price effects. 
To understand the key issue in this case, it is necessary to first understand the concepts of price 
suppression and price depression. Under the ADA and SCM Agreement, the national authority in 
AD/CVD investigations is required to consider, in its injury determination, three types of effects of 
subject imports on the prices of domestic like products: price undercutting, price depression and price 
suppression. As is commonly understood:  
a) “Price undercutting” indicates a situation in which subject imports are priced below domestic like 
products.  
b) “Price depression” depicts a situation in which the price of domestic like products has declined, 
due to the presence of subject imports.  
c) “Price suppression” suggests a situation in which the price of domestic like products has not 
increased as it should, due to the presence of subject imports.  
                                                     
1
 China–Grain Oriented Flat-Rolled Electrical Steel from the United States, Panel Report, WT/DS414/R (15 June 2012), 
modified by Appellate Body Report, WT/DS414/AB/R (18 October 2012) [hereinafter China-GOES]. 
2
 For comments on these reports, see Prusa and Vermulst (2014). 
3
 Panel Report, China–Grain Oriented Flat-Rolled Electrical Steel from the United States, Recourse to Article 21.5 of the 
DSU by the United States, WT/DS414/RW (31 July 2015) [hereinafter China–GOES 21.5]. 
4
 Panel Report, China–GOES 21.5, paras. 6.21-6.25 (ruling that China’s submission of MOFCOM’s public notice of 
termination of the measures was untimely).  
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Note that price depression and price suppression may occur regardless of the price level of subject 
imports as compared to that of domestic like products. 
In practice, it is relatively easy to establish “price undercutting”, as it is based on a showing of the 
fact that the price of subject imports lies below that of domestic like products. In comparison, it is 
much harder to establish “price depression” and “price suppression”, because these concepts involve a 
counterfactual situation: were it not for the subject imports, the price of domestic products would not 
have declined (price depression) or would have increased more (price suppression).  
It is important to note that, while MOFCOM’s Redetermination found price suppression and price 
depression, it did not make a finding on price undercutting. The evidence in this case suggests that the 
US imports were priced higher than domestic like product during the period of investigation.  
Somewhat surprisingly, China–GOES appears to be the first WTO case to address the issues 
concerning price suppression and price depression in the context of AD/CVD investigations. In the 
original proceedings, the Appellate Body discussed the concepts of price suppression and price 
depression, but did not focus on the issue of what is required to establish such price effects. In the 
compliance proceeding, the Panel concluded that MOFCOM’s findings on price suppression and 
depression did not meet the requirements of the ADA and SCM Agreement, but it also did not specify 
how such price effects should be established under the ADA and SCM Agreement. As a result, it 
remains unclear as to what constitutes a proper analysis of price suppression/depression in the 
AD/CVD context. The lack of a standard on the determination of these price effects is undesirable as a 
matter of WTO law and policy.  
In this comment, we call for the adoption of a clear and objective standard for determining price 
suppression/depression in AD/CVD investigations. Specifically, we advocate the need for economic 
modeling in making the determination. In the rest of the comment, we will explain our proposal from 
the legal perspective (Section 2), the economic perspective (Section 3) and the policy perspective 
(Section 4).  
2. Legal Analysis: What is required to establish price suppression/depression? 
2.1 The textual basis  
The investigating authorities in antidumping and countervailing proceedings are required to examine 
the price effects of dumped or subsidized imports on domestic like products. The general obligation to 
examine such price effects is set out in ADA Article 3.1 and SCM Article 15.1, which contain 
identical provisions except for the reference to “dumped” (in ADA) or “subsidized” (in SCM) imports:  
A determination of injury for purposes of Article VI of GATT 1994 shall be based on positive 
evidence and involve an objective examination of both (a) the volume of the [dumped or 
subsidized] imports and the effect of [dumped or subsidized] imports on prices in the domestic 
market for like products, and (b) the consequent impact of these imports on domestic producers of 
such products.  
The requirement to examine “price effect” is then elaborated in ADA Article 3.2 and SCM Article 
15.2: 
With respect to the effect of [dumped or subsidized] imports on prices, the investigating 
authorities shall consider whether there has been a significant price undercutting by the [dumped 
or subsidized] imports as compared with the price of a like product of the importing Member, or 
whether the effect of such imports is otherwise to depress prices to a significant degree or prevent 
price increases, which otherwise would have occurred, to a significance degree. 
Thus, in accordance with ADA Article 3.2 and SCM Article 15.2, the investigating authorities need to 
consider three types of price effect of dumped or subsidized imports on domestic like products: (i) 
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whether there has been “a significant price undercutting” by such imports, (ii) whether the effect of 
such imports is otherwise to depress prices to a significant degree (i.e., significant price depression), or 
(iii) whether the effect of such imports is to “prevent price increases, which otherwise would have 
occurred”, to a significant degree (i.e., significant price suppression).  
2.2 WTO case law  
Articles 3.2 and 15.2 do not define the terms of “price undercutting”, “price depression” or “price 
suppression”, or prescribe any particular methodology in determining these price effects. Nonetheless, 
WTO case law has established certain criteria for identifying the effect of price undercutting. 
According to the Appellate Body, price undercutting “involves situations where imports are being sold 
at prices lower than the domestic like products”, and the finding of price undercutting requires “a 
dynamic assessment of price trends” over the period of investigation.5  
By comparison, the criteria for establishing price depression and price suppression are less clear. In 
China–GOES, the Appellate Body explained that the concept of price depression “refers to a situation 
in which prices are pushed down, or reduced, by something.” 6  The finding of price depression, 
therefore, involves an observation of “a price decline”, and an analysis of whether the price decline 
“stems from” dumped or subsidized imports. 7  As for price suppression, the Appellate Body has 
established the following: (i) price suppression may occur with or without price undercutting or price 
depression; (ii) price suppression cannot be properly examined without a consideration of whether, in 
the absence of subject imports, prices "otherwise would have" increased; (iii) the effect of price 
suppression stems from relevant aspects of dumped or subsidized imports, “including the price and/or 
the volume of such imports.”8 Yet, the Appellate Body did not explain how the phenomenon of price 
suppression should be identified, or clarify how the causal relationship between dumped or subsidized 
imports and price suppression/depression should be established. The lack of a clear standard for 
finding the effect of price suppression and price depression under Articles 3.2 and 15.2 has led to 
confusion and uncertainties.  
2.3 Main arguments advanced  
In its Redetermination, MOFCOM found that subject imports (i) suppressed domestic prices in 2008 
and (ii) suppressed and depressed domestic prices in Q1 2009. With respect to price suppression, 
MOFCOM found that domestic industry was unable to raise prices despite rising costs, and cited the 
following as the causes: (a) increases in the volume of subject imports, (b) the loss of market share of 
the domestic industry predominantly to subject imports, and (c) price competition between subject 
imports and domestic like products.  
The controversy over MOFCOM’s finding of price suppression centred on the question of whether 
a comparison between prices of subject imports and domestic like products is required. MOFCOM did 
not make such a price comparison in the Redetermination. The United States argued that MOFCOM 
could not have concluded that subject imports had the effect of price suppression without comparing 
the actual prices of subject imports and the domestic like product.
9
 According to the United States, 
MOFCOM failed to compare the prices of subject imports and domestic like products, despite 
evidence in the record indicating that there was a substantial divergence in the prices of subject 
                                                     
5
 Appellate Body Reports, China– Measures Imposing Anti-dumping Duties on High Performance Stainless Steel Seamless 
Tubes (“HP-SSST”) from Japan and the European Union, WT/DS454, 460/AB/R, adopted 28 October 2015, para. 5.160.  
6
 Appellate Body Report, China–GOES, para. 141. 
7
 Id., paras. 138, 141.  
8
 Id., paras. 137, 138 and 141.  
9
 Panel Report, China–GOES 21.5, para. 7.29. 
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imports and domestic like products.
10
 In response to the US argument, China contended that Articles 
3.2 and 15.2 do not require investigating authorities to compare the prices of subject imports and 
domestic like products, citing the Appellate Body’s statement that, in light of the text of Articles 3.2 
and 15.2, price suppression or depression may stem from “the price and/or volume of such imports”.11 
As third parties in the dispute, Japan and the European Union expressed their respective opinions. 
Agreeing with the United States, Japan argued that an increase in the volume of subject imports or 
parallel pricing between subject imports and the domestic like product only establishes the potential 
for price suppression or depression, and not actual price suppression or depression by subject 
imports.
12
 The EU, on the other hand, was of the view that an increase in the volume of subject 
imports and a decline in the domestic industry’s market share, taken together with the existence of 
price competition between subject imports and the domestic like product, will generally indicate that 
subject imports suppress or depress domestic like products. However, the EU also added that, while in 
principle it may be possible to establish price competition between subject imports and the domestic 
like product without comparing the prices of subject imports and the domestic like products, it is 
unclear whether in practice it is possible to do so.
13
 
2.4 The Panel’s ruling 
Unlike the parties, the Panel did not consider the issue in this case to be whether price comparisons are 
mandated for the finding of price suppression under Articles 3.2 and 15.2. According to the Panel, 
since Articles 3.2 and 15.2 do not prescribe any particular methodology for the consideration of the 
effect of price suppression or depression, “investigating authorities retain some degree of discretion in 
adopting a methodology they deem fit”; but this discretion “is qualified by the overarching obligation 
set out in Articles 3.1 and 15.1 that investing authorities shall base their determinations on an objective 
examination of positive evidence of, inter alia, the effect of subject imports on the market prices of 
domestic like products.”14  
Consequently, the Panel did not consider it necessary to determine whether price comparisons are 
required in finding price suppression under Articles 3.2 and 15.2 “as a general matter of law”. Instead, 
it would consider “whether MOFCOM’s failure to make price comparisons in this particular case, in 
light of the evidence and arguments before it, meant that it failed to make reasoned determinations 
regarding price effects on the basis of an objective examination of positive evidence.”15 The Panel 
answered the question in the affirmative, citing two reasons. First, the Panel faulted MOFCOM for 
failure to consider the impact of non-subject imports (i.e., GOES imports not targeted in this particular 
AD/CVD investigation) on prices of domestic like products.
16
 Second, recalling that there was 
information before MOFCOM on the prices of subject imports, non-subject imports and domestic like 
product, the Panel found that “MOFCOM could not have reached a reasoned and adequate conclusion 
that the domestic industry’s prices were suppressed by the volume of subject imports, having failed to 
consider the relative prices of subject imports and the domestic like product at all.”17 This second 
reason, however, appears to be circular: MOFCOM’s failure to make price comparisons in this case is 
wrong because MOFCOM failed to make such price comparisons. 
                                                     
10
 Id., para. 7.43. 
11
 Id. 
12
 Id., para. 7.38. 
13
 Id., para. 7.37. 
14
 Id., para. 7.41. 
15
 Id., para. 7.44. 
16
 Id., paras. 7.52-7.57. 
17
 Id., para. 7.58. 
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In sum, the Panel declined to decide whether, as a matter of law, price comparisons between subject 
imports and the domestic like product are required in identifying the effect of price suppression under 
Articles 3.2 and 15.2, but nonetheless concluded that MOFCOM’s failure to make such price 
comparisons in this particular case is inconsistent with the Articles because MOFCOM’s finding was 
not “based on an objective examination of positive evidence” as required by Articles 3.1 and 15.1. In 
other words, as a matter of applying the law, the Panel held that price comparisons between subject 
imports and the domestic like product are required for finding the effect of price suppression in this 
particular case.  
Unfortunately, the Panel’s reasoning does not help clarify the criteria for finding the effect of price 
suppression. By design, Articles 3.1 and 15.1 set out the overarching obligation on injury 
determination in antidumping and countervailing investigations, and Articles 3.2 and 15.2 elaborate 
what such obligation entails with respect to the price effects of dumped or subsidized imports on 
domestic like products. Instead of clarifying what is required in identifying the effect of price 
suppression, the Panel relied on the general principle set out in Articles 3.1 and 15.2 to find 
noncompliance with Articles 3.2 and 15.2. The Panel’s approach begs the question: what constitutes 
“an objective examination of positive evidence” for the purpose of determining the effect of price 
suppression?  
2.5 Why a counterfactual analysis should be required 
We submit that for determining the effect of price suppression under Articles 3.2 and 15.2, a 
counterfactual analysis should be required as a matter of law. Our reasons are as follows. 
First, the text of Articles 3.2 and 15.2 implies a requirement to consider a counterfactual situation. 
As already noted, Articles 3.2 and 15.2 provide that, with respect to price suppression, the 
investigating authorities “shall consider” whether the effect of dumped or subsidized imports is to 
“prevent price increases, which otherwise would have occurred, to a significance degree.” The 
subjective mood of the provision suggests that the investigating authorities should find out where the 
prices of domestic like product would have been without the presence of dumped or subsidized 
imports. Obviously, this level of domestic price cannot be observed in reality, but is a counterfactual 
situation.  
Contextually, the concept of price suppression also exists in SCM Article 6.3(c), which has been 
interpreted by the Appellate Body to require a counterfactual analysis. SCM Article 6.3 details the 
meaning of “serious prejudice”, one of the adverse effects that may be caused by subsidies as 
identified by Article 5(c). Article 6.3(c) states that serious prejudice may arise where: 
the effect of the subsidy is a significant price undercutting by the subsidized product as compared 
with the price of a like product of another Member in the same market or significant price 
suppression, price depression or lost sales in the same market. (italics added) 
In United States–Upland Cotton (21.5-Brazil), the Appellate Body has interpreted the concepts of 
“price suppression” and “price depression” contained in Article 6.3(c). The following statement of the 
Appellate Body is worth quoting in full:
18
 
At a conceptual level, we see some differences between the concepts of "price depression" and 
"price suppression" as defined in the original proceedings. While price depression is a directly 
observable phenomenon, price suppression is not so. Falling prices can be observed; by contrast, 
price suppression concerns whether prices are less than they would otherwise have been in 
consequence of various factors, in this case, the subsidies. The identification of price suppression, 
therefore, presupposes a comparison of an observable factual situation (prices) with a 
                                                     
18
 Appellate Body Report, United States – Subsidies on Upland Cotton, Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Brazil, 
WT/DS267/AB/RW, adopted 20 June 2008, para. 351 (italics added). 
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counterfactual situation (what prices would have been) where one has to determine whether, in the 
absence of the subsidies (or some other controlling phenomenon), prices would have increased or 
would have increased more than they actually did. Price depression, by contrast, can be directly 
observed, in that falling prices are observable. The determination of whether such falling prices are 
the effect of the subsidies will require consideration of what prices would have been absent the 
subsidies. Thus, counterfactual analysis is an inescapable part of analysing the effect of a subsidy 
under Article 6.3(c) of the SCM Agreement. 
The Appellate Body then stated that one way to undertake the counterfactual analysis is “to use 
economic modelling or other quantitative techniques”, because these techniques “provide a framework 
to analyse the relationship between subsidies, other factors, and price movement.”19 According to the 
Appellate Body, “the relative complexity of a model and its parameters is not a reason for a panel to 
remain agnostic about them.”20  
In EC and Certain Member States — Large Civil Aircraft, the Appellate Body confirmed again that 
the use of a counterfactual analysis provides an adjudicator with a useful analytical framework to 
isolate and properly identify the effects of the challenged subsidies. In that context, the Appellate 
Body further explained:
21
 
In general terms, the counterfactual analysis entails comparing the actual market situation that is 
before the adjudicator with the market situation that would have existed in the absence of the 
challenged subsidies. This requires the adjudicator to undertake a modelling exercise as to what 
the market would look like in the absence of the subsidies. Such an exercise is a necessary part of 
the counterfactual approach. As with other factual assessments, panels clearly have a margin of 
discretion in conducting the counterfactual analysis. 
Thus, the Appellate Body has by now established a clear standard under SCM Article 6.3(c): In order 
to find a subsidy has the effect of “significant price suppression”, the adjudicator must undertake a 
counterfactual analysis that involves a modelling exercise.  
It should be noted that, in the original proceedings of China–GOES, the Appellate Body did refer to 
the concepts of price suppression and price depression in SCM Article 6.3(c), including a citation to its 
interpretation of the concepts in US–Upland Cotton (21.5-Brazil) quoted above.22 The Appellate Body 
made the references in the context of discussing the relationship between dumped or subsidized 
imports and domestic prices. By referring to its interpretation of the same concepts in SCM Article 
6.3(c), the Appellate Body reinforced its view that Articles 3.2 and 15.2 require the investigating 
authorities to establish a causal link between subject imports and price suppression or depression. By 
focusing on the issue of relationship between subject imports and domestic prices, however, the 
Appellate Body did not discuss whether a counterfactual analysis should be required in finding the 
effect of price suppression or depression under Articles 3.2 and 15.2. 
In this regard, one might question whether it is appropriate to set the same standard for the 
determination of price suppression and depression under Articles 3.2 and 15.2 as under SCM Article 
6.3. Other commentators have suggested that the Appellate Body might hold the panel determination 
under Article 6.3 to a higher standard, since the panel operates as the initial trier of facts in the 
“serious prejudice” determinations, whereas in the context of antidumping and countervailing 
investigations, the Appellate Body seemed satisfied to have panels engage in procedural rather than 
substantive review of national agency determinations (Sapir and Trachtman, 2008; Davey and Sapir, 
2010). 
                                                     
19
 Id., para. 356. 
20
 Id., para. 357. 
21
 Appellate Body Report, European Communities and Certain Member States –Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil 
Aircraft, WT/DS316/AB/R, adopted 1 June 2011, para. 1110.  
22
 Appellate Body Report, China–GOES, paras. 141-142, fn. 230. 
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In our opinion, requiring the national authority to undertake a counterfactual analysis under 
Articles 3.2 and 15.2 does not necessarily mean the review standard for the national agency 
determinations must be the same as that for the panel determinations under SCM Article 6.3. What at 
issue here is not the review standard, but how the concept of price suppression should be interpreted. 
Does the concept of price suppression have an inherent economic logic, i.e., does it presuppose a 
comparison between a factual situation and a counterfactual situation? Does a counterfactual analysis 
necessarily entail a modelling exercise? If the answer to these questions is affirmative, then there 
should be no reason not to require the national authorities to undertake such counterfactual analysis 
under Articles 3.2 and 15.2. Put differently, whether the effect of price suppression requires a 
counterfactual analysis is a matter of interpreting the term of Article 3.2 and 15.2, not a matter of 
setting a review standard. So long as the national authority conducts the required analysis, the panel 
and Appellate Body can review such analysis according to whatever standard of review that is deemed 
proper under those provisions.  
As Prusa and Vermulst (2014, 198) pointed out insightfully in their comment on the original 
proceedings of China–GOES, the Panel in the case did not address the critical question of what 
constitutes a proper price effects analysis under Articles 3.2 and 15.2. Consequently, it remains 
unclear what China, or for that matter any other Member, needs to do in future cases in order to 
produce a satisfactory price analysis. According to their observation, the problem with China’s price 
effect analysis in the case was to a large extent due to its poor documentation of the basis for 
determining that subject imports had caused price depression and/or price suppression. In practice, 
“neither the US nor the EU rigorously assess the impact that alternative factors might have played in 
the evolving pricing dynamics”, but their facility with public reporting largely obscures the fact. 
Having identified the lack of a real standard as the key issue in the price effects analysis, Prusa and 
Vermulst (2014, 259-261) also recommended the use of econometric techniques for the future. 
3. Economic Analysis: Methods to determine the causal link between subject imports 
and price effects  
The key issue in the AD/CVD injury determination is causality. While the overall causal relationship 
between dumped or subsidized imports and injury to the domestic industry is examined under ADA 
Article 3.5 and SCM Article 15.5, the determination of price effects under Articles 3.2 and 15.2 forms 
part of “the basis” for the overall causation analysis contemplated in Articles 3.5 and 15.5.23 With 
respect to the inquiries under Articles 3.2 and 15.2, the Appellate Body has required an investigating 
authority to consider whether subject imports have “explanatory force” for the occurrence of 
significant depression or suppression of domestic prices.
24
 In deciding whether such explanatory force 
exists, “the authority is not required to conduct a fully fledged and exhausitve analysis of all known 
factors that may cause injury to the domestic industry, or to separate and distinguish the injury caused 
by such factors.”25 Nonetheless, “where the authority is faced with elements other than subject imports 
that may explain the significant depression or suppression of domestic prices, it must consider relevant 
evidence pertaining to such elements for purposes of understaing whether subject imports indeed have 
a depressive or suppressive effect on domestic prices.”26  
With the above causality standard in mind, in this section we will first explain why the suppressive 
or depressive effect of subject imports on domestic prices has not been shown in MOFCOM’s 
Redetermination. We will then procced to explain why trends analysis, which has typically been 
                                                     
23
 Appellate Body Report, China–GOES, para. 143. 
24
 Id., para. 136. 
25
 Id., para. 151 (italics original). 
26
 Id., para. 152. 
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accepted as a method for injury determination, is not sufficient as a causality test for the price effects 
determination. We will then propose alternative methods that can provide a causality test much closer 
to the spirit of the law. 
3.1 MOFCOM’s causality analysis  
In a nutshell, the reasoning put forward by MOFCOM for causality in price effects goes as follows. 
Imports from subject countries (USA and Russia
27
) rose by 60% in 2008. This resulted in an increase 
of 5.56% in the market share of subject countries, which then suppressed the prices of China’s 
domestic producers. While the factual evidence presented by MOFCOM (see Table 1) indicates an 
actual price increase for the domestic Chinese GOES of 14.53% in 2008, this increased level of price 
was allegedly much below what should have been the level of Chinese GOES price in the absence of 
subject imports, hence Chinese domestic GOES suffered price suppression.
28
 MOFCOM reasoned that 
in 2008, unit production costs of domestic producers rose by 63%, which should have resulted in a 
much higher increase in the prices of domestic GOES if domestic producers could have passed 
through the increase in costs to market prices as in times of normal competition. MOFCOM 
determined that the inability for domestic producers to raise GOES prices was due to the strong rise in 
the volume of subject imports. 
Table 1: GOES Facts 
Year 
Subject 
Imports 
(tons) 
Subject 
Imports 
% change 
in volume 
Subject 
Imports 
Market 
share 
Non-
subject 
Imports 
(tons) 
Domestic 
Producer 
Market 
Share % 
change 
Price 
subject 
imports 
(RMB/ton) 
Price 
subject 
imports 
% change 
Price  
non-
subject 
Imports 
(RMB/ton
) 
Price 
domestic 
product 
% 
change 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
2006 83 838 
  
169 845 
 
25 913 
 
25 468   
2007 84 600 +0.91% -3.35% 183 348 +7.9% 26 683 -2.9% 28 700 +6.6% 
2008 135 900 +60% +5.56% 213 516 -5.65% 31371 +17.6% 30 999 +14.43% 
Source: MOFCOM Redetermination 2013 
The Panel did not find this sufficient to conclude that subject imports resulted in price suppression of 
domestic GOES. One reason given by the Panel that questioned the linkage between subject imports 
and price suppression was that non-subject imports were almost double the size of subject imports 
(Table 1 col. 4) and that the price of non-subject imports did not differ much from subject imports 
(Table 1 col. 8). Hence the Panel questioned how MOFCOM could come to the conclusion that the 
inability to raise domestic prices was entirely driven by subject imports. Another concern the Panel 
raised was that in 2008 a new Chinese GOES producer, Baosteel, had entered the market. This new 
entry may have resulted in overcapacity and could subsequently also have lowered Chinese GOES 
prices, thus questioning whether subject imports were the main cause of domestic price suppression. 
Moreover, as noted in Section 2, the Panel faulted MOFCOM for not making a price comparison 
between subject imports and domestic like product, which the Panel deemed necessary in this 
particular case to provide conclusive evidence on price-supression.  
                                                     
27
 China’s antidumping measures were brought against GOES imports from the United States and Russia. Russia did not 
take part in the WTO case.  
28
 MOFCOM also found price depression as well as price suppression in 2009 Q1, during which domestic GOES prices 
actually declined compared to 2008 Q1.  
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3.2 Alternative methods for establishing causality 
The question we aim to address here is not whether MOFCOM was right or wrong in claiming price 
suppression. We simply do not have conclusive evidence to answer that question. Instead, we ask 
ourselves what MOFCOM could have done differently to make a more convincing case for domestic 
price suppression. What would have been needed to convince the panel that subject imports have 
“explanatory force” for the suppression of domestic prices?  
As already pointed out, establishing price suppression requires the construction of a counterfactual. 
A counterfactual analysis demonstrates what Chinese domestic GOES prices would have been in the 
absence of subject imports. But how to engage in such a counterfactual analysis? As noted above, 
since WTO law does not prescribe any particular methodology in determining price supression, WTO 
members retain a certain degree of discretion in choosing their own methodology. Although such 
discretion “is not without limits”,29 the Panel did not specify these limits. Consequently, it is up to 
WTO adjudicators to decide what these limits should be in each particular case. 
Below we present a number of techniques that have been used by other WTO members to make a 
convincing case of the causal link between subject imports and domestic prices. For each method, we 
assess its usefulness in determining causality.  
3.2.1 Trends analysis 
In several antidumping cases initiated by the EU and the US, the investigating authorities used “trends 
analysis” as a way to provide evidence of linkage between subject imports and domestic price 
evolutions, as required by ADA Articles 3.2 and 3.5. For example, Prusa and Sharp (2001) report that 
for the United States, the traditional injury analysis conducted by the International Trade Commission 
(USITC) has long consisted of “trends analysis”. While this type of analysis varies from case to case, 
its overall structure typically consists of a review of time series data pertaining to (1) the imports 
under investigation; (2) the prices for sales of the relevant imports ànd their domestic counterparts; 
and (3) lost sales or revenue on domestic transactions. More specifically, in a “typical” antidumping 
case, the investigating authorities consider in parallel, the evolution of imports and the evolution of 
domestic variables. Often, these parallel trends are illustrated graphically during the course of the 
investigation period, which typically involves time series data up to three years prior to the initiation 
of an AD case during which suspicions of dumping of subject imports arise.  
Consider the following hypothetical example illustrated in Figure 1a where it is clear that a rising 
trend in subject imports during the investigation period (from t-3 onwards) coincides with a falling 
trend in domestic market share of a particular product. Moreover, note from the example that during 
the investigation period, a clear reversal of trends occurred. Before t-3, subject imports were stable and 
domestic market shares were on a postive trend, whereas during the investigation period after t-3, 
subject imports rose strongly, while the domestic sales’ trend reversed and started falling.  
Additionally, suppose that in the same example the evolution of subject import prices were given as 
in Figure 1b, where a fall in subject import prices would be followed by a parallel trend in domestic 
prices. Again, visual inspection of Figure 1b clearly suggests that from t-3 onwards, foreign subject 
import prices started falling strongly which coincided with a reversed trend for domestic prices that 
also start falling.  
                                                     
29
 Panel Report, China–GOES 21.5, para. 7.41.  
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Figure 1a: Quantity Evolution          Figure1b: Price Evolution 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   t-5       t-4       t-3      t-2      t-1      t                                 t-5    t-4     t-3     t-2    t-1     t 
 
To claim causality between subject imports and domestic price trends, the investigating authority in 
this hypothetical example would then also need to show that non-subject import trends evolve 
differently than subject imports. Again consider Figure 1a, where non-subject imports are also shown, 
but where it is clear that their time trend did not change drastically during the investigation period. 
And when considering Figure 1b, we also note that the price trend of non-subject imports evolved 
differently than for subject imports i.e. remained relatively stable even during the investigation period.  
Based on the hypothetical example presented in Figures 1a and 1b, an investigating authority could 
make a convincing case that the downward trends in domestic sales and domestic price is caused by 
subject imports which becomes clear through visual inspection of parallel trends. Note that it is 
immaterial whether domestic prices lie above or below the foreign prices, but what is important is the 
parallel movement in subject import prices and domestic prices. In other words, when trend reversals 
occur for both import prices and domestic prices around the same time during the dumping period, 
there is a strong suspicion of injury.  
Now how does trend analysis provide for a counterfactual? A counterfactual can be constructed 
from the pre-investigation period trends of foreign and domestic variables. In other words, 
counterfactual values are given if the trends would have continued as they did before the dumping of 
subject imports. Such trends analysis provides a simple way to construct a counterfactual price or even 
counterfactual imports.  
To illustrate what we mean by that, consider the dashed lines in Figure 1a and 1b. The dashed lines 
show a continuation of the trend for domestic sales along the lines of pre-investigation period trends. 
And similarly for domestic prices, the dashed lines show how domestic prices would have evolved in 
the absence of a rise of subject imports and what domestic prices would have been in any particular 
year after the rise in subject imports. Hence, based on trends analysis one can construct counterfactual 
market shares and prices based on time series trends in the data observed prior to the investigation 
period. If, in any particular year, the actually observed domestic price lies substantially below what the 
domestic price would have been according to pre-investigation period trends, as shown on the dashed 
line as is the case in Figure 1b, the investigating authority can convincingly claim price 
suppression/depression. Domestic price suppression/depression then refers to the lack of increase or 
decrease in domestic price from t-3 onwards. 
Subject imports 
Price subject 
imports 
Actual 
Domestic 
sales 
Actual 
Domestic 
Price 
Price non-
subject imports 
Non-subject imports 
Counterfact
ual 
domestic 
sales 
Counterfactual 
Domestic 
Price 
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MOFCOM did not present a “typical” trends analysis as the one illustrated in Figures 1a and 1b. 
This may have been the reason that the evidence presented by MOFCOM was not considered 
convincing by the US and by the Panel. The question then is what the evidence would have looked 
like in the GOES case if MOFCOM had turned to a trends analysis. The investigation period, i.e. the 
period during which the US is accused of dumping, is very short and only involved 2008 and the first 
quarter of 2009, which makes it difficult to observe particular trends. Based on the data presented by 
MOFCOM and shown in Table 2 below, we graph the pattern of subject and non-subject imports in 
Figure 2a and 2b. 
Table 2: Volumes and prices of subject and non-subject imports 
 
Source: Panel Report, China–GOES 21.5, para. 7.150 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Data in Table 2 
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Source: Data in Table 2 
A visual inspection of Figure 2a does not suggest a different trend of subject imports (in black) versus 
non-subject imports (in gray) of GOES, which is what would be required for a linkage between subject 
imports and domestic price evolution. Similarly Figure 2b does not show a markedly different trend in 
import pricing between subject (black) and non-subject imports (gray), except for the first quarter of 
2009 in which the price of subject imports lies below that of non-subject imports, but the 2009 price is 
still higher than the 2006 price, so one cannot really speak of a trend reversal. 
More importantly, what is lacking in Figures 2a and 2b is an evolution of the domestic sales in tons 
and domestic price levels (RMB/ton) of GOES respectively. Hence, the trends in subject and non-
subject variables cannot be compared with the corresponding Chinese values as this information was 
lacking and not revealed by MOFCOM. The only numbers made available by MOFCOM was a 
relative evolution (in %) of domestic market shares and of domestic price changes, as shown in Table 
1 in columns (5) and (9) respectively. MOFCOM argued that it did not reveal prices because the 
Chinese petitioners requested confidentiality. To make a convincing case, however, MOFCOM could 
have shown the evolution of domestic sales in tons and the domestic prices to the Panel on a 
confidential basis.
30
 In short, the evidence presented by MOFCOM does not allow for a simple trends 
analysis to be made in this case.  
Trends analysis, however, has its limits. Because trends analysis heavily relies on visual inspection 
of trends, it is considered as “more art than science” (Prusa and Sharp, 2001). While these trends are 
clearcut in our hypothetical example, such is not always the case in reality (Ahn and Zanardi, 2016).  
More importantly, trends analysis is not sufficent to demonstrate causality between subject imports 
and price effects. That is because trends analysis does not go beyond documenting correlations in the 
data, and a correlation does not necessarily prove causality. Put differently, documenting that the two 
variables – subject import price and domestic price – move in the same direction is not conclusive 
evidence of the subject import price causing a drop of domestic price. The reason is that correlations 
do not exclude the possibility that third variables, other than subject import prices, also have an effect 
on domestic prices, e.g., overproduction by the domestic industry, or non-subject import prices, or 
macro-economic variables (financial crisis), which may also be at play to a small or large extent. 
Trends analysis is not equipped to disentangle the importance of each of these factors, since it does not 
                                                     
30
 Under DSU Article 13, a Member has the obligation to “respond promptly and fully to any request by a panel for such 
information as the panel considers necessary and appropriate”; and the panel may not reveal any confidential information 
without “formal authorization” from the Member providing the information. 
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attribute weights to the different factors that may explain domestic prices. Thus, trends analysis is not 
suitable to serve as the standard methodology for identifying the effect of price suppression/depression 
under ADA Article 3.2 and SCM Article 15.2.  
MOFCOM, therefore, would best have chosen alternative methods to claim the effect of price 
suppression/depression to begin with. In fact, in the late 1980’s, the USITC in several of its cases 
already started questioning the validity of trends analysis due to its subjective interpretation. Below we 
describe two alternative methods that economists consider to correspond to empirical economic 
modeling and constitute an objective way of engaging in injury investigations in general.  
3.2.2 Regression analysis 
The subdiscipline in economics that offers a toolbox of statistical techniques and regression analysis to 
establish causality between variables, is called econometrics. Econometrics allows economists to 
determine whether there is an economically significant impact of one variable on another. This is 
typically done by first collecting time series data on the variables and then applying regression 
analysis on this data.  
Hence, to an economist, the causality test is a matter of regression analysis and econometrics which 
uses time series data (indicated by t). A relatively simple approach would be to estimate a regression 
equation as in (1) in which the evolution of Chinese domestic prices of GOES would be the dependent 
variable (y) on the left side of the equation which varies in every year t and for every firm i. All the 
explanatory variables that potentially can have an impact on domestic prices (𝑦𝑖𝑡), would be on the 
right-hand side of the regression equation and would include variables such as US import prices (𝑥1𝑡), 
Russian import prices (𝑥2𝑡) but would now also include non-subject import prices (𝑥3𝑡), Chinese 
production (𝑥4𝑡) and Chinese demand for steel (𝑥5𝑡). One cannot exclude that other variables may also 
affect domestic prices, other than 𝑥1𝑡 to 𝑥5𝑡. To address that, equation (1) also includes year effects 
(𝜗𝑡) and firm-level fixed effects (𝜃𝑖) and a rest category (ε): 
Equation 1: 
 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽. 𝑥1𝑡 + 𝛾. 𝑥2𝑡 + 𝛿. 𝑥3𝑡 + 𝜇. 𝑥4𝑡 + 𝜌. 𝑥5𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖 + 𝜗𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡   (1) 
 
Any statistical software package designed for regression analysis allows one to estimate a regression 
equation as in (1) above. It will generate estimates for the relevant regression coefficients (𝛽, 𝛾, 𝛿, 𝜇, 𝜌) 
whenever sufficient data observations are available.
31
 These regression coefficients then provide a 
useful indication on how important each of the right-hand side variables (𝑥1, 𝑥2, 𝑥3, 𝑥4, 𝑥5)
32
 are for 
explaining Chinese domestic prices of GOES (𝑦𝑖𝑡), the left-hand side variable of regression equation 
(1).  
                                                     
31
 Regression coefficient 𝛼 , can be considered as a constant and a control variable to estimate the other regression 
coefficients correctly.  
32
 The last three variables are important in the estimation of equation (1), but require a more technical explanation that is 
not necessary to understand the main message. The variable 𝜗𝑡 is typically referred to as “time dummies” and controls for 
business cycle effects that may affect domestic prices (𝑦𝑖𝑡). The variable 𝜃𝑖  accounts for firm-level variables that may be 
difficult to observe or collect information on such as the cost of inputs, the wages paid, the profit margin charged, etc. 
and are referred to as firm-fixed effects which means they enter the regression as firm dummies which are assumed 
constant over the years and finally 𝜀𝑖𝑡  is a “rest category” and represents the data variation of 𝑦𝑖𝑡 , that remains 
unexplained by the right-hand side determinants of domestic prices included in (1). This rest category does not generate a 
regression coefficient. These last three variables are well understood by any econometrician but a further explanation on 
them would take us too far here. Therefore, we refer to Wooldridge (2009), a standard econometrics textbook, for the 
interested reader. 
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The regression coefficients of explanatory variables can then be tested for their statistically significant 
impact on the left-hand side variable. Put differently, regression analysis allows the econometrician to 
determine whether a variable such as “price of subject imports” (𝑥1𝑡) has a significant effect on 
“Chinese domestic prices” (𝑦𝑖𝑡), and compare the significance relative to that of other right-hand side 
variables in the regression. This way it is relatively straightforward to determine whether “price of 
non-subject imports” (𝛿) has more of an effect on the domestic market share of steel in China, as the 
US claimed, than the “price of subject imports” (𝛽). A negative and significant value for the β-
coefficient resulting from the regression analysis can then be interpreted as evidence in line with the 
allegation that the “price of subject imports” had a negative impact on domestic prices and domestic 
prices would have been higher in the absence of dumped or subsidized imports.  
A significant difficulty with such a regression analysis is that most right-hand side explanatory 
variables are “endogenous” which would result in biased regression coefficients that may not be 
trusted. For example, there can be a problem of “reverse causality” between Chinese domestic prices 
and Chinese production: Chinese production is likely to affect domestic prices in China, but 
simultaneously, the price at which GOES can be sold for in China will determine the number of 
producers offering it to the market and hence will determine total domestic production, which is the 
basic law of supply and demand in economics. In the case of this potential two-way causality, one 
cannot correctly estimate the regression coefficient on the importance of “Chinese production” as a 
determinant on Chinese domestic steel prices. The theory of econometrics however provides several 
possible ways to deal with endogenous variables in order to get unbiased estimates for regression 
coefficients. One common solution is to replace each endogenous variable with a good instrument 
(alternative variable) that does not suffer from the two-way causality but is highly correlated with the 
endogenous variable.
33
 For example, in the case of “Chinese production” (𝑥4𝑡 ), one can consider 
taking as an alternative variable Chinese GOES exports abroad. It is clear that Chinese exports are 
likely to be highly correlated with Chinese production, thus making it a good potential candidate as an 
instrumental variable. In addition, Chinese exports will not suffer from two-way causality as the 
demand for Chinese GOES exports is unlikely to be affected by the domestic prices of Chinese GOES, 
potentially making it a good instrument to deal with the endogeneity of the variable “Chinese 
production” (4).  
To estimate all the regression coefficients in equation (1) correctly, therefore, one would have to 
find good “instruments” for all the endogenous variables. While such an econometric exercise is by no 
means simple or straightforward, it is nevertheless feasible thanks to the techniques offered by the 
theory of econometrics. A clear indication of the merits of econometrics and the benefits it can render 
is that other fields of the law have long been using it. For instance, in the field of competition policy 
and merger analysis, economic and econometric modeling play an important role in decision-making 
(Budzinski and Ruhmer, 2010). Thus in our opinion, the application of econometric modelling can 
also make AD/CVD practice more objective, transparent and less idiosyncratic. 
In our view, MOFCOM could have turned to regression analysis without violating the 
confidentiality restriction requested by the Chinese petitioner. This could have been done in one of 
two ways. First, MOFCOM could have defined domestic prices, the dependent variable y in the 
regression equation (1), as an index variable, where the actual values of Chinese domestic prices could 
have been normalized
34
 such that confidentiality would not have been breached. Second, it could have 
                                                     
33
 The theory of econometrics has shown that a good “instrument” (alternative variable) has to be highly correlated with the 
endogenous variable but should not be affected by two-way causality. For additional explanation on these econometric 
issues we refer the reader to standard econometrics textbooks such as Wooldridge (2009). 
34
 A normalization is often used in econometric variables. This implies that the absolute value of a variable in a particular 
year is set equal for example to “100” and the absolute values of the variable in subsequent years is expressed as an 
increase or decrease from “100”. In such a way the normalized variable correctly reflects the growth rate over time of the 
absolute values of the variable in question without revealing the actual values. 
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estimated regression equation (1) entirely in “first differences” or in “growth rates”.35 Econometric 
theory can show that estimating equation (1) in first differences should yield the same estimated 
regression coefficients (𝛽, 𝛾, 𝛿, 𝜇, 𝜌) but with the additional advantage that it accounts for all omitted 
variables that are not time varying
36, such as the constant of the regression equation, given by α and all 
other variables that may affect domestic prices but that do not vary over time.
37
 
However, the difficulty that MOFCOM would have faced in this particular case is that there were 
only two Chinese petitioners, which largely limited the number of data points available. The only data 
variation in regression equation (1) would come from the variation in domestic prices over time, which 
may not have been sufficient to get reliable regression coefficients.
38
 Therefore, while regression 
analysis in general can be regarded as much better equipped to address the causality issue, it requires a 
sufficient number of observations,
39
 which in this particular GOES case may not have been the case.  
3.2.3 Structural modeling 
A more sophisticated econometrics approach would be the estimation of a structural model, in which 
the GOES steel market in China would be modelled with a demand equation and a supply equation. 
The structural econometric estimation would be directed at simultaneously estimating the parameters 
of the model, such as the elasticity of demand and the elasticity of supply in the domestic steel market. 
To correctly estimate the demand elasticity in the GOES market, however, one would need 
information on the cost of Chinese GOES production and/or other shifters that may affect the position 
of the domestic GOES supply curve. The advantage of a structural model is that upon identification of 
demand and supply parameters, this then allows for counterfactual policy simulations and the 
evaluation of other policy experiments in the Chinese GOES industry.
40
 A fine example of such a 
structural approach is described by Prusa and Sharp who explain the methodology that was used by the 
USITC for the first time in 2000 on cold rolled steel (Prusa and Sharp, 2001: 63-78).  
The estimation of such a structural model in principle has a similar objective as a simple regression 
analysis, that is, it can account for various factors that may influence the prices of domestically 
produced GOES. Therefore, a structural model would also allow MOFCOM to determine the extent to 
which a decline or the lack of increase in domestic market prices of GOES was actually attributable to 
subject imports.  
In this particular case, MOFCOM may not have had a sufficient number of data points to estimate 
such a structural model. However, we consider this to be the exception rather than the rule. In most 
AD/CVD cases, there are more observations available on domestic petitioners, allowing for a 
sufficient number of data points to engage in structural modeling.  
                                                     
35
 Thus, instead of y, we would define the left-hand side variable as 
𝑦𝑡+1−𝑦𝑡
𝑦𝑡
, which is a growth rate and similarly for all 
right-hand side variables. For more details, see Wooldridge (2009). 
36
 To see this, note that a constant does not vary over time so its growth rate turns zero and it drops out of the regression in 
(1). For more details, see Wooldridge (2009). 
37
 The firm-fixed effects, such as 𝜃𝑖 , would drop out of the equation when estimating equation (1) in first differences which 
is helpful to estimate regression coefficients correctly.  
38
 A rule of thumb in econometrics is that the larger the number of data points, the more reliable the estimated coefficients 
are. When there are very few data points, the statistical software may not generate any regression coefficients, hence 
estimation in equation (1) cannot be made. 
39
 A minimum of 100 observations is typically regarded as the lower bound to perform regression analysis. 
40
 A further explanation of structural models would take us too far, but see Prusa and Sharp (2001) for further explanation 
on such an approach.  
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4. Policy Implications 
4.1 Tightening WTO disciplines on antidumping and countervailing measures 
The methodology we proposed would have the effect of tightening WTO disciplines on injury 
determination in AD/CVD investigations, since it would narrow the scope of discretion currently 
enjoyed by the national authority in choosing methodologies to determine the price effects of subject 
imports under ADA Article 3.2 and SCM Article 15.2. But is such a discipline-tightening effect 
intended by the ADA and SCM Agreement?  
In the original proceedings of China-GOES, China had submitted that the object and purpose of 
Articles 3.2 and 15.2 is to leave the authorities with discretion on the issue of price effects. The 
Appellate Body disagreed. According to the Appellate Body,  
Articles 3 and 15 are intended to delineate the framework and relevant disciplines for the 
authority’s analysis in reaching a final determination on the injury caused by subject imports, and 
to ensure that the analysis and the conclusion drawn therefrom is robust. Thus, … the requirement 
to consider whether subject imports have explanatory force for significant price depression or 
suppression occurring in the domestic market, pursuant to Articles 3.2 and 15.2, is not within the 
‘discretion’ of the investing authority.
41
  
If the Appellate Body is correct, then the discipline on conducting the price-effect analysis under 
Articles 3.2 and 15 must be tightened. That is because the scope of discretion currently enjoyed by the 
investing authorities in choosing methodologies for determining price effects cannot ensure that the 
price-effect analysis and the conclusion drawn therefrom is “robust”. The approach we proposed, in 
contrast, is capable of meeting the standard articulated by the Appellate Body.  
4.2 Feasibility of econometric modeling  
Econometrics is the application of mathematics and statistical methods in economics, which is of 
general utility in testing economic hypotheses and in helping distinguish between alternative 
explanations. It is true that econometricians can develop alternative solutions to test the same 
hypothesis. But if no matter which econometric method is used, “subject imports” always show up 
with a significant and negative coefficient in a regression analysis or structural modeling that aims to 
explain the evolution of domestic prices, one can truly speak of a “robust” result which is unlikely to 
be questioned.
42
  
We note that, in trade law and in AD/CVD law in particular, the use of econometrics by 
investigating authorities and by WTO panels remains relatively rare. This is in stark contrast with 
other fields of law. For example, in the field of competition law and policy, which is closely related to 
the field of industrial economics, the use of econometric modeling is more prevalent and econometrics 
has been widely accepted as a useful tool to support decision-making. If such is the case in related 
fields of law, it is hard to see why the same cannot or should not be done in AD/CVD law, given what 
econometrics can potentially offer to decision-making in trade law and policy. 
4.3 Defense against criticism of “judicial activism” 
When there is no clear standard on how the effects of price suppression and depression should be 
determined, it is ultimately within the discretion of WTO adjudicators to decide whether a particular 
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 Appellate Body Report, China–GOES, para. 153.  
42
  Typically, the use of one econometric approach would not be regarded as sufficient evidence for new research results to 
be published in academic journals. Instead, authors would be required to show through the plethora of econometric 
methods that their results are “robust”. 
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determination by the national authority is consistent with Articles 3.2 and 15.2. In exercising this 
discretion, however, the adjudicators are susceptible to criticisms that their decision is biased or that 
their decision amounts to “adding to or diminishing the rights and obligations” provided in the ADA 
and SCM Agreement, in violation of DSU Article 3.2. By adopting the methodology that is grounded 
in econometric modeling, the adjudicators will forgo most of their (unwanted) discretion in deciding 
what is inherently a matter of economic evaluation rather than legal reasoning. By turning to expert 
opinions, therefore, WTO judges will be able to insulate themselves from potential accusation of 
“judicial activism” in the interpretation and application of Articles 3.2 and 15.2. Needless to say, this 
can only help enhance the legitimacy of the WTO dispute settlement system.  
5. Conclusions 
What this case highlights is the lack of a clear standard for identifying the effect of price suppression 
and price depression under ADA Article 3.2 and SCM Article 15.2 that has led to much confusion and 
uncertainties in antidumping and countervailing investigations. Currently, the national authorities may 
choose a methodology they see fit in finding such price effects, subject only to the general obligation 
in Articles 3.1 and 15.2 that their findings shall be based on “an objective examination of positive 
evidence.” What constitutes “an objective examination of positive evidence” in the finding of price 
suppression/depression, however, remains undefined and subject to the interpretation of WTO 
adjudicators in each given case.  
This state of affairs is in sharp contrast with WTO jurisprudence on “price suppression” and “price 
depression” under SCM Article 6.3(c), which lists such price phenomena as the types of “serious 
prejudice” that may be caused by subsidies. In US–Upland Cotton and cases thereafter, the Appellate 
Body has made it clear that, in order to find price suppression and price depression caused by 
subsidies, the adjudicator must undertake a counterfactual analysis that involves modeling exercises.  
In this comment, we have provided a legal analysis explaining why the same requirement 
established under SCM Article 6.3(c) should apply to the identification of price suppression and price 
depression under ADA Article 3.2 and SCM Article 15.2. We have then offered an economic analysis 
detailing how different econometric modeling exercises can help determine whether there is a causal 
link between subject imports and domestic prices, which is the key requirement in finding the effect of 
price suppression/depression under Articles 3.2 and 15.2. In addition, we have considered certain 
policy implications of our proposal. We believe the adoption by the national investigating authority of 
the same methodology as required by the Appellate Body under Article 6.3 is feasible in practice, 
considering that econometric modeling has already been widely accepted in competition laws and 
other fields of law under national legal regimes. Although there are limits on what economic modeling 
can offer in decision-making, and although modeling exercises are also susceptible to manipulation, 
there should be no doubt that a requirement to use the methodology as articulated by the Appellate 
Body under Article 6.3 will bring greater certainty and more transparency to the injury determination 
in antidumping and countervailing investigations. For this reason, the adoption of a clear and more 
objective standard for finding price suppression and depression under ADA Article 3.2 and 15.2 
should be in the long-term interest of all AD/CVD users, as well as the interest of the institution of 
WTO dispute settlement.  
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